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ABSTRACT Based on observational as well as experimental accounts, this meta-analytical article deals 
with the structure of opportunities and limitations that is encountered in party competition by political actors 
(especially parties, but, in more personalized contexts, also candidates) when they try to decide whether to 
prioritize between strategies based on the differentiation of positions on political issues and strategies based 
on factors that are not directly related to competing on issues. Further, the article outlines the mechanisms 
that serve to interconnect these two strategies and thus lead to a full-fledged political competition with 
sufficiently developed positional differentiation. In contrast, emphasizing the disappearance of “the politics 
of goals” in favour of “the politics of outcomes” is not, according to the current state of knowledge in the 
field, a rewarding strategy of political competition among parties. 
KEYWORDS Politics, political parties, party competition, political space, position, valence, issue 
ownership
The politics of goals and the politics of outcomes: position, valence, and issue 
ownership
In current European political thought, discussions on “the disappearance of politics” have 
been fairly animated. Politiek van goede bedoelingen [The Politics of Good Intentions] 
(1999; Czech translation 2001) by the Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis can be regarded 
as one of the manifestations of this stream of thought. Achterhuis’s work sharply criticizes 
the ways in which individual European countries and their respective ideologies approached 
the Kosovo issue, an issue of high saliency at the time Achterhuis was writing this book. 
In relation to the framing of the Kosovo operation as humanitarian, Achterhuis asks if this 
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1 This article has been written as part of the research project No. P408/GA13-20548S “Experi-
mentální výzkum volebního chování a rozhodování ve vysoce personalizovaných volbách“ 
(Experimental Research of Voting Behavior and Decision-making in Highly Personalized Elec-
tions), supported by the Czech Science Foundation. The text of this article to a large extent draws 
(in its references) on my book Politický prostor a politická témata. Studie k soutěži politických 
stran [Policy Space and Political Issues: A Study of the Competition among Political Parties], pub-
lished in 2014. The book deals with competition amongst political parties in a much broader con-
text. In this article, I suggest how the interpretive framework introduced in the book may be used 
to tackle specifi c questions related to party politics and election competition. I would like to thank 
both reviewers for their comments which have improved the quality of the text. 
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marks the end of the era when the core of politics was competition among differing interests, 
in favour of the politics of “moral decisions” within which the role of politicians is to solely 
talk about the means of implementing these decisions – but the goals are generally shared. 
According to Achterhuis, this change in emphasis is based on a seriously misguided presup-
position that social outcomes can be “implemented” and that they depend, more or less, on an 
efficient technique of implementation, rather than on any external factors. Achterhuis consid-
ers this emphasis on the means of implementation to be the biggest risk in current political 
development. 
This article examines the incentives for the disappearance of politics that can be situated 
more in the domestic political sphere, particularly in its inter-party competition. It devotes 
attention to the way in which political parties handle political issues. More than anything, the 
article is a kind of a meta-analytical study that tries to capture the paradigmatic shift which 
has taken place in this area in the last several years. For those who prefer the politics of goals 
to the politics of means and outcomes, the article brings good news. This is because empiri-
cal studies have shown that even though the structure of opportunities that encourage parties 
to turn towards the politics of outcomes or at least to turn away from the politics of goals is 
quite broad and varied, the competition amongst political parties is governed by rules which 
themselves contain incentives that draw it back towards a competition about goals. At the 
same time, it has become clear that the relationship between the politics of goals and the poli-
tics of means and outcomes is further complicated by the fact that it is not a zero-sum game – 
a gain for one side does not automatically mean a corresponding loss for the other side. 
I view “the disappearance of inter-party politics” more or less non-normatively, as 
a deviation from the usual, “normal” competition amongst political parties on issues, a com-
petition that I define in accordance with Sartori (2005: 331) and de Vries (2010) on the basis 
of the categories of visibility and controversy. I presuppose that a necessary condition for 
the politicization of issues is that parties define their position on them, and that they do so 
by explicitly articulating what the issues are as well as by specifying in what ways their own 
position differs from the positions taken by their competitors, and in this way, a competi-
tion is created amongst the various parties. This makes it easier for voters to choose amongst 
the parties as it makes it easier to find a connection between their own position and that 
of the particular political party. 
Let the opening premise of the discussion that follows be that everyone that works with 
political issues (whether a political party or a candidate) has several options as to how to 
strategically approach them. The first option is based on taking particular political positions, 
and it is connected to the parties’ efforts to get closer to the views of the voters while at the 
same time drawing nearer, or sometimes further away, from the positions of other parties. The 
second option, which in this article is called valence, has at its core an emphasis on the com-
petence of the party (either in relation to a specific issue or in general). It targets voters’ con-
fidence that this party does not just offer good solutions, but that it is capable, often in con-
trast to the competing parties, of actually achieving these solutions. Finally, the third option, 
here called issue-ownership, centres on making the issues that the party has traditionally been 
highly rated on by the voters appear more salient while de-emphasizing issues on which it 
has been rated otherwise. Even from this brief description it can be seen that, in terms of the 
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intensity of engaging in the conflict amongst various political goals, these three strategies are 
not of equal strength. While taking different positions on individual issues encourages politi-
cal conflict, emphasizing the character of those responsible for political measures or high-
lighting the consistency between who they are and what they want links political conflict to 
the question of implementation. Stressing only certain issues and at the same time ignoring 
others leads to the rather paradoxical situation in which the political discourse contains issues 
that are sufficiently salient but not sufficiently contentious – and this again dangerously dis-
tances political competition from the politics of goals. This raises the question: Where in 
political competition can be found the mechanisms that correct its course and lead it back 
towards positional rivalry, from “non-competition” towards competition? 
Political competition and “non-competition”: Downs, Stokes, Riker 
and “the rewarding tactics”
The first to systematically develop the idea of political “non-competition” was Anthony 
Downs, in the 1950s. Downs was more of a public choice economist than a political scientist. 
He summarized his thoughts in his deductively constructed dissertation, titled An Economic 
Theory of Democracy, which he wrote in 1957. After its publication in 1965 (Downs 1965), 
it became and continues to be one of the most widely cited works of political science. In it, 
Downs devoted considerable energy to drawing extensive parallels between market compe-
tition and the political competition amongst parties. He based his work on concepts such as 
profit maximization, spatial location in the (political) market, voter rationality, and the acces-
sibility of political information. He drew on the work of economists Harold Hotelling (1929) 
and Arthur Smithies (1941) that focused on locating companies in the most competitive spa-
tial location possible.
In Downs’s world, which this American political scientist himself, on several occasions, 
describes as ideal and hypothetical, there are two basic types of actors in politics. One type is 
represented by political parties or candidates, whose goal is to maximize the number of votes 
they get in elections. The other type consists of voters, who aim to maximize the personal 
benefit they can get from their choice. What makes finding common ground between parties 
and voters easier are political issues. Downs assumes that, on the one hand, every voter hopes 
to gain something from the executors of political authority, and that some of these hopes are 
stronger than others. On the other hand, parties take positions on issues, and in this way hope 
to gain the votes of the electorate, or at least as much of it as possible. Thus, both types of 
actors are “maximizers” in that they behave so as to gain as much profit from the election as 
they can (cf. Chytilek 2014: 23–24). 
In every spatial dimension, which constitutes an analytical substitution of one political 
issue, voters as well as parties can be represented by their ideal point – the most widely pre-
ferred political solution or policy result. The simplest analytical example is just one dimen-
sion of politics, in which the voters’ preference is tightly connected to the spatial proximity 
of the voter and the candidate, and the voter simply chooses the candidate whose position is 
closest to his or her own. However, politics is fundamentally multidimensional, and so vot-
ers have to view the benefit from their preference as the total of the vector distances between 
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their personal ideal point and the ideal points of each party on each topic. Voters consider 
each party in this way, and then create a party differential amongst them – the difference of 
the benefits from their preferences. If this differential crosses a certain limit, which is indi-
vidually based, the voter decides to vote, and if this limit is not crossed, the voter remains 
indifferent, saves the costs, and does not vote. It is this effort to save the costs of the voters as 
well as their own that leads parties to present their policies through their “ideologies” as well. 
These ideologies do not represent a set of specific political measures but rather offer a norma-
tive view of the world, “how it should be”, which is often quite vague and can be interpreted 
in many different ways. Ideologies form one of the spatial dimensions, and if they are to fulfil 
the role of a cognitive shortcut for the voters, their content has to correlate sufficiently with 
the specific political measures of the respective parties (Downs 1965: 102–103). 
Downs’s ideas about how political competition amongst parties develops are discussed 
in the eighth chapter of his book. Downs’s preliminary assumption is that in bipartisan sys-
tems with a unimodal distribution of voters, parties have strong incentives to take positions 
close to the median voter (“in the middle” of the electorate) because this strategy brings 
them the most votes. Nevertheless, he immediately weakens this argument, which would 
otherwise logically lead to an overlap in the positions of political parties and therefore to 
“non-competition”, by asserting that this rule does not have to apply absolutely – the mid-
dle strategy increases the risk that voters from the edges of the distribution spectrum will 
not cast their votes. Rather, they will choose to abstain or not take part in the election at all 
(this expresses the idea of elastic demand proposed by Arthur Smithies). At first sight, this 
voter strategy seems irrational since, after all, spatial logic presupposes that voters should 
always vote for the party spatially closer to them. However, in democracies, elections are 
repeated acts. Therefore, voters who support a more extreme position on a particular issue 
expect the party to “learn its lesson”, and then in the next election, rather than again tak-
ing a middle-position, to promote a more extreme position closer to the voters standing 
on the extreme. 
This is also why Downs repeatedly emphasizes in his work that it is precisely the dis-
tribution of voter preferences that is the key variable in the shape of political life because it 
influences the strategies of the political parties and, in general, their spatial competition. For 
instance, if the distribution of the voters has two peaks and the peaks are at a great distance 
from each other, it leads to an instability in the political system – the political party that has 
won tries to please the voters whose votes ensured its power to govern, and it implements 
policies that bring only marginal benefits to the voters who did not vote for it, due to the 
large spatial distance between them and the party. In an extreme case, this situation causes 
a collapse of the regime and a revolution (Downs 1965: 120). When voters are distributed 
more or less evenly along the entire political spectrum (poly-modal distribution), bipartism 
becomes difficult or even impossible, and multipartism is the natural mode of the competi-
tion amongst political parties, if the electoral system does not block it with an institutional 
obstacle (cf. Chytilek 2014: 25–27). However, for the purposes of this article it is important 
to take into consideration that, regardless of voter distribution or institutional factors such as 
the features of the electoral system, competition in the political space always offers parties 
some incentives to differentiate themselves in connection to political issues. For Downs and 
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his followers (e.g. Robertson 1976), the question is only the range of the differentiation and 
the flexibility this range exhibits over time. 
A fundamental critique of Downs’s model was published in the prestigious journal 
American Political Science Review, in an article by Donald Stokes (1963). In relation to com-
petition and “non-competition”, Stokes makes two important arguments that are relevant for 
the discussion here. The first one concerns the fact that Downs’s model is too static in terms 
of the structure of the political issues. Stokes criticizes this model for not taking into account 
the presupposition that the dimensions of the political conflict amongst parties may develop 
(some may open, others may close), and so may their saliency as perceived by the voters. 
According to Stokes, Downs’s theory lacks an explicit integration of the presupposition that 
in political competition, different issues are represented to a different degree at different 
times. He sees the dichotomous character of the category of the present in Downs’s thinking 
as a cardinal misunderstanding of the character of political competition and as a simplifica-
tion that completely devalues the explanatory capacity of Downs’s model. As he comments: 
Political fortunes are made and lost according to the ability of party leaders to sense what dimen-
sions will be salient to the public as it appraises the candidates and party records [...] But the 
skills of political leaders who must maneuver for public support in a democracy consist partly 
in knowing what issue dimensions are salient to the electorate or can be made salient by suitable 
propaganda. (Stokes 1963: 372)
Stokes connects this objection with another criticism, asserting that it is imprecise to assume, as 
Downs does, that in each dimension there exist many positions which make sense in respect to 
trying to gain more votes. According to Stokes, the dimensions of political conflict do not allow 
many such positions – in fact, the opposite is true. Usually, they allow only very few, and quite 
often, a reasonable voting position is represented by only one alternative: “The empirical point 
that needs to be made is that many of the issues that agitate our politics do not involve even 
a shriveled set of two alternatives of government action” (Stokes 1963: 372). Based on this, 
Stokes distinguishes between positional issues that allow spatial differentiation and valence 
issues that, in contrast, are characterized by offering one, by far the most advantageous, position 
that is held by almost all the voters as well as by almost all the parties or candidates. 
When valence positions are presented in the past or present tense, they are linked with 
the purpose of someone gaining some political points through them or someone being blamed 
for something. When they are presented in the future tense, they hold political promises, 
and they contain the expectation that voters will evaluate which party is capable (“more 
competent”) to make these promises a reality. Empirically, Stokes finds a strong presence 
of valence issues in American presidential campaigns, issues that are connected to corrup-
tion, coping with economic crises, and with economic or post-war re-building. However, 
Stokes’s approach goes much deeper in this respect – it also includes the idea that the rela-
tionship between valence and positional issues is much closer than it might seem: “It is of 
course true that position-issues lurk behind many valence-issues” (Stokes 1963: 373). As 
Stokes sees it, the assessment of whether a certain issue is a valence or a positional issue 
should not be made a priori, but should be made in connection to analysis of how the issue is 
discussed in the political competition. Stokes also suggests strategies that are used to make 
28
SOCIÁLNÍ STUDIA / SOCIAL STUDIES 1/2016
a positional issue out of a valence issue – if some fairly general political concept (for exam-
ple, the fight against communism) is conceptualized at a secondary level so that it would 
allow a discussion about the best ways to solve it. Then positional differentiation is not only 
possible, but also likely. On the other hand, there are also strategies that are used to bring 
positional issues closer to valence issues. According to Stokes, this is done through hard-
to-question social goals such “total prosperity” (cf. Chytilek 2014: 32–35). Therefore, much 
more than Downs, Stokes connects party politics with “non-competition” in which there is 
not enough conflict and in which the structure of issues with only one acceptable solution 
turns politics away from issues and towards who is more competent to solve them. 
This disagreement between Downs and Stokes was later evaluated, with the perspec-
tive afforded by a decade, by the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori. Sartori’s argu-
ment can be regarded as a sober defence of Downs’s original model. On the one hand, Sartori 
agrees with Stokes that the economic basis of Downs’s model is shaky and the question 
whether voters are really such strict maximizers of benefit as Downs asserts resists opera-
tionalization as well as the measurement that should follow it. On the other hand, Sartori 
also recognizes Downs’s undeniable contribution, in that his model opens the key question of 
the influence of the parties’ location in relation to one another (that is, the intensity of politi-
cal competition) on their success. To put this even more clearly, Downs raises the question 
of what the “rewarding tactics of inter-party competition” is. In response to this question, 
Sartori says (and extensively explains in his model of polarized pluralism) that while Downs 
at first obviously emphasizes the centripetal character of party interactions and considers the 
centrifugal character to be only consequently enforced by circumstances, his own conception 
indicates that both the centrifugal and centripetal strategies are completely valid options in 
a party’s efforts to maximize the number of votes; that is, they both are “rewarding tactics” in 
elections. Therefore, the layout of the political space in which parties operate as well as the 
matter of the “rewarding tactics” of inter-party interactions are both foregrounded.
The theoretical conceptualization of the third category – issue ownership – is somewhat 
more recent. Just as Anthony Downs’s work was seminal in the area of political space theory, 
the main inspirational figure among issue-ownership theorists is another important American 
political scientist, a member of the Rochester School, William Riker. Riker was the first the-
orist to deal with the question of what rhetorical strategies are chosen by political actors in 
campaigning. As early as 1983, he came up with the terms “heresthetics” and “agenda con-
trol”. The purpose of heresthetics is to structure the political situation so that the user of her-
esthetics will win, “no matter if he persuades his opponents or not” (Riker 1983: 60). As far 
as the content of political campaigns is concerned, Riker (1993: 112) believed that the basic 
strategy should be to introduce and emphasize the issues on which a particular party feels 
itself to be strong and credible, rather than the issues that the party wants to use in discussion 
to confront the opposition. Riker has termed this the dominance principle. However, parties 
do not have an incentive to highlight the issues on which no one can gain a clear advantage, 
and therefore, such issues are usually not even present in campaigns. Riker has called this the 
dispersion principle. Thus the main goal of election campaigns (cf. Hammonds and Humes 
1993: 142) is not to take specific political positions, but to decide which issues will bring the 
candidates the best strategic advantage by simply being made salient.
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Therefore, the rewarding tactics of party competition is completely separated from 
spatial theories, when the concept is used in the classical sense, by its emphasis on issues 
on which the party considers itself to be strong and by its simultaneous effort to keep in 
the background the issues on which the party’s competitors feel strong. The fact that the 
key characteristic is the effort to gain dominance through manipulating the saliency of 
issues distinguishes issue-ownership theories from valence theories. In valence theories, 
parties compete on issues where there is one – by far the most strongly preferred – posi-
tion, and the competition amongst parties is a competition for voters’ confidence that the 
party’s announced position is held credibly. However, the competition continues “within 
the issues”, – not “about the issues”, and neither is it then followed by a competition 
“through the issues”, which would be a key presupposition in theories of issue ownership. In 
regards to its relationship to competition and its intensity, issue ownership – which empha-
sizes saliency as a central characteristic in dealing with issues – is a more flexible concept 
than spatial competition (which supports it) or valence (which reduces it). Nevertheless, 
Riker’s stricter approach, in which parties only manage the saliency of the issues but con-
flict is avoided (the dispersion principle), brings the handling of issues closer to “non-com-
petition”. Therefore, two out of the three strategies create incentives for “non-competition” 
and the disappearance of inter-party politics. Why does “non-competition” not take over in 
the end? The answer lies in the interconnectedness of the theories mentioned – especially the 
latest observational and experimental studies that show that the way in which these theories 
are used resembles the rock-paper-scissors game, in which one strategy has the potential to 
beat or at least neutralize the other. 
Position, valence, and issue ownership as interconnected strategies 
of political competition amongst parties
The vitality of the politics of difference in spatial competition
Downs’s model was further elaborated in a whole range of studies that tried to add more 
variables, usually with the justification that the additions would bring the model closer to 
describing how competition amongst parties works in the real world2 (cf. Chytilek 2014: 
44–50). The first major elaboration was suggested by the American political scientist Bernard 
Grofman (1985). According to Grofman, the ways voters make decisions are complicated by 
the fact that they take into consideration as one of their reference points the status quo of par-
ties’ positions on the issue at the moment, and they regard the position that each candidate has 
taken with a varying degree of reservation, called discounting. For instance, when a candidate 
2 In this context, it is necessary to also add that these modifi cations do not contradict the spirit 
of the model and that Downs had anticipated them. For instance, he says (Downs 1965: 39) that 
voters understand that the parties will not succeed in achieving everything and therefore, thinking 
about the party differential does not involve simply assessing election programmes, it is more about 
which of the points on the programme of the particular party can be realistically achieved. Downs 
also points out that voters put different degrees of emphasis on different issues, an assertion which 
was later incorporated into directional models.
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brings up a position that differs widely from the status quo, the voter’s line of thinking is that, 
if elected, most likely this candidate will not be able to change the status quo as much, and 
so the candidate’s politics will end up somewhere in between his or her initial ideal point and 
the status quo. That voters usually underestimate the degree of change that is possible tends 
to lead the candidates to position themselves “further away” from a political issue (that is, to 
suggest political measures that will transform it more significantly). This can be seen as addi-
tional incentives for stronger positional differentiation, for the broadening of what is “imagin-
able” within the given political issue, and as a factor that works against the disappearance of 
inter-party politics. 
Another way of looking at how parties locate themselves is offered by so-called direc-
tional models. In these models, important variables include not only the positions of voters and 
candidates, but also the status quo in the given political arena, often called the referential or 
neutral point. The key variable for assessing the benefit of the choice is not the absolute prox-
imity and distance between the candidate’s and the voter’s positions, but their direction – that 
is, whether both the candidate’s and the voter’s ideal points are positioned in the same direction 
from the neutral point. Thus, in these models, “positions” do not refer so much to the absolute 
distance of the position from the neutral point, but more to the direction of the distance and also 
to the intensity with which the candidate represents the given direction. The position of the indi-
vidual is therefore dichotomous (it is either for or against) and emotionally influenced, in that 
different individuals are interested in different issues to a different degree (cf. Classen 2007). 
The first of these models (Matthews 1979) is significant especially for its presupposition that it 
is not realistic to expect the voter to think about the candidates in terms of absolute distances, 
as is required within the framework of Downs’s model. The costs of accessing this information 
are burdensome for the voter. The candidates can realistically hope to communicate to the vot-
ers only the direction in which they want to change the status quo. Voters then deduce their total 
benefit from the candidates based on how often the direction of the change corresponds (or does 
not correspond) with what they themselves want and on the relative intensity with which the 
voters as well as the candidates support the change in this or that direction (for more detailed 
information, see Merill and Grofman 1999: 25–29; Eibl 2011: 69–72). 
An alternative directional model, which has quickly become mainstream in regards to 
directional thinking, is offered by Stuart McDonald and George Rabinowitz (1989). As a key 
criterion, they add intensity into the model. When the voter as well as the candidate is on the 
same side from the neutral point, the voter’s benefit from the candidate in this spatial dimen-
sion is always positive, and in the opposite case, it is always negative. The exact amount of 
the benefit then depends on the intensity of the voter’s and the candidate’s relationship to the 
neutral point. The further away the voter and the candidate are in the same direction from the 
neutral point, the bigger the voter’s benefit from this choice. In contrast, with issues on which 
the candidate and the voter are close to the neutral point, the benefit is limited and small, and 
so these issues are not as important for the voter’s decision-making. From amongst the can-
didates from whom the voter is equidistant according to basic spatial model, the voter always 
chooses the candidate who is further away from the neutral point and thus supports change 
with more intensity, in cases where it can be expected that the candidate will achieve this 
change, and the voter’s benefit from this choice will therefore be more significant. 
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From the point of view of the problem under examination here, directional models pose 
an interesting question: in competition over issues, does it make any sense at all to locate 
oneself in a moderate position in relation to the current situation? If a voter who is slightly 
left of centre has to choose between a candidate who is positioned slightly to the right of cen-
tre (and of the voter) and a candidate who is on the extreme left, which one will the voter 
choose? While according to Downs’s model, the voter will choose the moderate candidate, 
directional models predict that the voter will choose the extreme candidate. Each model thus 
gives parties very different incentives as to how to locate themselves, and each implies a dif-
ferent range of competition amongst candidates. This conflict was tackled experimentally 
with a substantial delay. 
Classen (2007) experiments with situations in which, when the choice is between two 
candidates, the spatial proximity model and the directional model each predicts a different 
choice to be made by the voter. He observes that when the choice is made in an environment 
of one-dimensional simplification (as in the American context, which is based on the liberal-
ism – conservatism axis) and/or in the case of fairly expert or pragmatic issues, voters tended 
to follow the logic of the spatial proximity model. However, on the value-oriented issue of 
abortion, more voters made their choice in accordance with the directional model. But this 
was strongly so only amongst the participants against abortion. This phenomenon, which had 
been described earlier (Adams et al. 2004), is called balancing, and it pertains to conditions 
in which an individual purposefully chooses to support a much more radical position than 
the one where he or she stands. Voters do so because they dislike the status quo, and believe 
that the result of strengthening proponents of a spatially more extreme position forces a more 
radical change than they themselves would normally support. This, they believe, will result in 
a compromise between the radicals and the status quo, which will end up very close to these 
voters’ own position. It is important to point out here that Adams’s argument is permeated 
with the logic of spatial proximity models (for instance, it considers the candidates’ locations 
as well as the voters’ thinking about them to be positions which correspond to some content 
in the real world), and Classen uses this argument to question the suggestion that voters were 
influenced purely by directional logic on the issue of abortion. 
The experiment conducted by Lacy and Paolino (2010), which randomly exposed sub-
jects to experimental conditions in which there was one extreme candidate and one moderate 
candidate in an environment of multidimensional issue competition, provided quite strong 
evidence for the assertion that the spatial proximity model can serve as an adequate interpre-
tive framework for voters’ decision-making, while the subjects’ behaviour did not demon-
strate any evidence of the assumptions of the directional model. In contrast, a recent study 
(Kropko 2012) of the data from the American presidential election supported the assumption 
that both the voters who tend to follow directional logic and the voters who strictly follow 
spatial logic participate in the same election. Another interesting conclusion of this study was 
the failure to confirm the poorly tested presuppositions of McDonald et al. (1995) that spa-
tial choice is used by less sophisticated voters and directional logic is used by more sophis-
ticated voters. In terms of whether people vote spatially or directionally, the level of the 
voters’ sophistication did not play a role. The latest study devoted to this same problem in 
the European context (Fazekas and Méder 2013), in accordance with several earlier studies 
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(Lachat 2008; Pardos-Prado and Dinas 2012), concluded that in regards to the ratio of vot-
ing based on spatial proximity and on directional choice, an important aspect is the level of 
polarization (the magnitude of the ideological differences amongst the parties on the right-left 
axis). In countries with the highest level of polarization, both the basic types of spatial choice 
were represented with about the same frequency, while in little polarized political communi-
ties, the choice based on spatial proximity was a significantly more frequent expression of 
spatial choice than the directional option (cf. Chytilek 2014: 49–50). 
Thus the rewarding tactics of political parties must take into consideration that in the 
electorate, there are voters who think strictly within the categories of proximity and distance, 
but there are also those for whom the crucial aspect is the direction of the proposed change. 
How do parties respond to this fact? Amongst empirical studies devoted to the spatial loca-
tion of parties in multiparty environments, probably the most significant contributions to 
date are two studies published in 2014 and conducted by the same co-authors (Ezrow, Tavits 
and Homola 2014a, 2014b). They pose the question: under what conditions should parties 
locate themselves at more extreme positions from the median voter and under what condi-
tions should they converge closer to it? As they see it, in order to assess which strategy is 
more advantageous, it is important to take into account that voters bear costs related to gain-
ing information about different parties. Following in the footsteps of earlier studies (Alvarez 
1999; Koch 2003), they present voters as individuals reluctant to take risks – the more uncer-
tain they are about a party’s programme, the less inclined they are to vote for it since, if 
things do not turn out well, it could lead to a result very different from their preferred choice. 
At the same time, from the point of view of clarity and a chance at an unbiased perception, 
more extreme positions are more advantageous than those in the middle, which hinder voters 
from easily formulating expectations as to how the party might behave if it comes to power 
and begins to govern.
The advantage of extreme parties is usually the clarity and consistency of their pro-
grammes, which is something that middle-position parties can provide only rarely. Middle-
position parties also cannot match the level of the urgency of the issues promoted by extreme 
parties (cf. Hinich and Munger 1994, 1997; Kitschelt 2000). Similar arguments have been 
proposed by supporters of directional logic who contrast the “clear and strong positions” of 
non-centrist parties with the “ambivalent and lukewarm preferences” of parties positioned in 
the middle. Not only are centrist positions less clear, but, what is even more important, that 
is how they appear to be. Therefore, voters’ costs related to gaining information about these 
parties increase, which in turn decreases the parties’ attraction. According to Ezrow et al., this 
effect of “the curse of the middle” should be especially strongly demonstrated in countries 
where the party spectrum is not very stable and where voters have not had sufficient oppor-
tunity to develop long-term party affiliation. As Ezrow shows, typical examples of this are 
post-Communist countries with fluid party systems (Birch 2003; Tavits 2005), a low level 
of political partisanship, and weak institutionalization of political parties (van Biezen 2003; 
Tavits 2013), which causes very weak links between parties and society (the voters). The par-
ties’ instability also makes it harder to establish generally accepted categories of “the right” 
and “the left” (Tavits and Letki 2009), giving the parties incentives to behave inconsistently 
in relation to their programmes if they are elected (Druckman and Roberts 2007). Therefore, 
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such parties do not have long-term histories which allow voters to use information shortcuts 
in their cases, forcing the parties to use other ways of satisfying their voters with enough 
information. From this point of view, taking centrist positions is not advantageous.
Based on these kinds of ideas, Ezrow et al. have formulated different presuppositions 
for post-Communist countries and west European democracies – while in post-Communist 
countries support for a party, ceteris paribus, increases along with its distance from the 
median voter, in west European countries this effect is brought about by the party’s closeness 
to the median. Further, Ezrow et al. postulate that parties which are hard for voters to clearly 
identify ideologically will generally gain less support than parties that are easily identifiable 
(regardless of the given region). Finally, Ezrow et al. assert that voters in post-Communist 
countries feel surer about the positions of non-centrist than centrist parties. They tested these 
hypotheses on the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Both of 
the basic hypotheses were confirmed, as well as the two secondary ones that make up the 
suggested causal mechanism (the easier identifiability of the positions of extreme parties 
as opposed to centrist ones, and the weak election performance of hard-to-identify parties). 
These effects can be detected only in the data from post-Communist countries. In contrast, in 
developed democracies the relationships amongst these variables are changeable and uncer-
tain. Ezrow et al. conclude by saying that their findings may have a broader significance as 
they indicate that in systems undergoing a transition, taking more extreme positions should 
be the dominant strategy, since centrist positions better representing the median voter do not 
pay off. Ezrow et al. present a similarly formulated argument in another article dealing with 
the influence of political partisanship and party identification on the taking of extreme posi-
tions. While in countries with a low level of partisanship and party identification it is advan-
tageous to use the strategy suggested in their previous study and take extreme positions, in 
countries with a strong party tradition it is not necessary to so overtly provide cognitive short 
cuts though party programmes, and parties therefore tend to take more moderate positions – 
and they do so even in places where the voters are polarized. 
The hybrid character of valence competition
Nevertheless, positional location is just one strategy available to actors in political compe-
tition amongst parties. The other strategy is emphasizing the valence character of politics. 
Stokes (1992: 144) defines valence as a dimension of politics “on which parties or leaders 
are differentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in 
the public’s mind with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or 
disapproves”. According to this definition, valence issues include not only political measures 
that a large majority of voters see as beneficial and desirable, and would like to be carried 
out as effectively as possible (such as promoting economic growth, suppressing criminality, 
and so on). Simultaneously, as Michael Clark (2009) points out, the concept of valence also 
includes more general characteristics of parties or candidates that are related to “nonpolicy 
related aspects, namely parties’ images with respect to competence, integrity, and unity”. 
Certainly, there can be other constitutive sources of valence as well. For instance, Lilleker 
(2014: 106–107) adds the party’s or the candidate’s chances of winning the election and the 
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enthusiasm generated by their main message. Therefore, according to the classical definition 
of this category of inter-party competition, voters evaluate political actors based not on their 
positions in a given dimension (such as crime or corruption) but based on the voters’ percep-
tion of the degree to which the political parties themselves are near to or far from the ideal sit-
uation in the dimensions (such as crime or corruption). Thus, it is not sufficient to only hold 
an appropriate position on the issue. At the same time, the perceived trademark of the candi-
date or the party needs to be in line with this position. This factor has been aptly expressed 
by Giovanni Sartori (2005: 334), whose definition highlights the following characteristics of 
a valence issue: it is non-partisan, it is not the subject of any disagreement, but it does serve 
as a tool for parties to criticize one another for not acting in accordance with the positions 
they verbally claim to support. 
Political science has been rather at a loss as to how to tackle valence issue competition, 
and various disagreements about what a valence issue is (allowing only one politically fea-
sible solution) and what it is not make it almost impossible to operationalize valence in this 
way. The situation is somewhat easier in regards to the non-issue components of valence, 
that is, components that are not linked with concrete political issues but are nevertheless used 
in political competition because they give some actors an advantage over others. Primarily, 
this concerns the “incumbency advantage” (Fiorina 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Austen-
Smith 1987) and the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck 1988; Anderson 2000; Alvarez and 
Nagler 1998). However, to better understand the valence choice phenomenon, it is neces-
sary to operationalize factors such as political scandals, party disunity, and the assessment of 
a party’s overall competence (Clark 2008).
It is precisely these factors, tightly connected with the politics of outcomes and “non-
competition,” which can generate incentives for actors lagging in these areas towards a wider 
spatial differentiation. While this in no way diminishes the influence of valence factors in 
political competition, it does again increase the significance of spatial factors. This premise is 
formulated in the frequently cited work of McDonald and Rabinowitz (1998) in which they 
ask why in two-party systems convergence towards the median voter does not usually take 
place. In McDonald and Rabinowitz’s opinion, it is due to valence politics and issues such as 
the state of the economy, which they nevertheless connect mainly with the performance of the 
government and the governing party. In the case of the government’s weak performance and, 
simultaneously, very similar positions of parties on issues, support for the governing party 
would completely collapse. Therefore, political actors choose a location further away from 
their political competitors so that even in the case of unsuccessful government, there would 
be voters to whom they are spatially closer and for whom their spatial proximity or distance 
serves as a basis for their choice in elections. Thus, as McDonald and Rabinowitz see it, the 
fact that there exist valence issues which turn political competition towards the non-issue 
valence of parties necessarily encourages spatial differentiation amongst parties. This then 
leads to equilibrium in political competition, in which there is always the valence dimension 
connected to a retrospective assessment of the government, as well as positional issues on 
which there is sufficient spatial differentiation amongst parties. 
Here it is interesting to note that a similar argument had been brought up by Downs, too. 
Downs analyzes a hypothetical situation in which the platform positions of the government 
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completely overlap with those of the opposition, a scenario in which it is then the voters’ 
assessment of the competence of the government and the opposition that resolves the situa-
tion. According to Downs, this is the reason why the opposition, which in contrast to the gov-
ernment can choose the distance of its position from that of its competitor, rarely takes the 
same position as the government; without access to the state budget and the power of govern-
ment, the opposition has less of a chance to demonstrate its competence. It is of course pos-
sible that the reputation of the government and its governance is very bad, and then the vot-
ers’ assessment of who is more competent will turn out more favourably for the opposition. 
However, as Downs argues, even this is not a good reason for the opposition to take the same 
position as the government and thereby in effect identify itself with government policies. 
Even in this situation, positional differentiation is a surer way to win the election. 
The premises regarding this type of relationship between valence and positional pref-
erence were not confirmed until relatively recently (Clark and Leiter 2014), in a study that 
examines the influence of valence on voter choice in conjunction with the degree of the 
ideological dispersion of political systems. Conventional wisdom would suggest that in sys-
tems with little ideological polarization, character valence plays an important role in explain-
ing voters’ preferences, probably more important than in ideologically fragmented political 
communities in which the party remains distant from a segment of the voters in the political 
space even in the case of a loss or gain in valence, and so it should be harder for the party to 
obtain their votes. However, the conclusion of Clark and Leiter’s study is counterintuitive, 
as the relationship they found is exactly opposite – the influence of the character valence of 
the party on election results increases with an increasing degree of polarization. The authors 
explain this finding by suggesting that an increased degree of polarization increases voters’ 
interest in politics and their cognitive needs are higher, and that is why they pay more atten-
tion to valence. Given the fact that Clark and Leiter used aggregated data in their research, 
their proposed explanation can be regarded as only an untested presupposition. Nevertheless, 
it brings a new insight into the relationship between valence and spatial competition, which 
can be seen as two categories that sometimes complement each other and sometimes even 
support each other.
In other words, for a party which regards itself as having very good chances in “the poli-
tics of outcomes”, it is not advantageous to diminish the politics of goals and political conflict 
because this strategy does not increase the benefits that can be obtained from a strong posi-
tion in the area of valence – in contrast, it decreases them. Clark and Leiter assert nothing 
less than that a rewarding strategy for parties with high valence is to simultaneously encour-
age a positional issue conflict because it is this conflict that brings foregrounds their valence 
advantage, more so than in the case of competition without positional polarization. This con-
clusion has been confirmed by another study (Pardos-Prado 2012), which found that in reality 
valence choice offers a stronger explanation in party systems as well as electorates that are 
more polarized than in those that are more consensual. In respect to issues such as immigra-
tion and the environment, an increasing degree of polarization activates voters’ preferences 
more intensely based on both spatial and valence criteria. For the Spanish political scientist, 
this was evidence that both strategies support each other by generally drawing voters’ atten-
tion to political topics. 
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Issue ownership as an ideal type 
The conceptualization the working of ideal competition based on the mechanism of issue 
ownership has been developed by Dolezal et al. (2014). The central characteristic should be 
issue differentiation which is expressed in each party preferring to “talk” about issues that are 
different from those of other parties. Another premise is that even though parties differ in the 
amount of attention they pay to individual issues, they do not significantly differ in the posi-
tions they take on any given issue. Therefore, from these two assumptions it is possible to 
deduce that parties differ more in the emphasis they place on issues than in the positions they 
take on them. The fourth premise is that parties focus especially on the issues they “own”. 
Thus, according to the definition used here, this type of competition is more a “non-competi-
tion”. That is why it is fitting to examine 1) whether it is realistic for this kind of competition 
to even take place, and 2) whether in any country, if there exists a significant imbalance in 
how parties are associated with political issues or they are granted different levels of compe-
tence on them, some competition does take place. 
Issue ownership is a fairly stable variable. The relationship between competition for the 
ownership of a certain issue and a party’s position on this issue is even closer than the rela-
tionship between a party’s position and its valence. As has been shown for instance by the 
American political scientist Bonnie Meguid (2005, 2008) and the Austrian political scientist 
Markus Wagner (2012), new issues – or issues that were being purposefully overlooked by 
mainstream actors – are most often introduced into political discourse by new, initially small 
parties that take an extreme position (that is, a position that is very far from other political 
actors), and only later does the saliency of these issues sometimes increase for other actors 
as well. This observation has even been linked with the formulation of the concept of the 
niche party, that is, a subject that enters into the party system thanks to its focus on just the 
issues that are not dominant or not even addressed at all within the political system. A niche 
party takes a clearly identifiable position far from the other parties, and that at the same time 
promotes the valence of these issues. This line of argumentation has been further developed 
(Tavits and Letki 2014) to include the strategies of mainstream parties that for some reason 
are not satisfied with the current dimensional structure of political issues, and so try to change 
the structure or at least attempt to modify the valence of particular issues. This elaboration is 
significant in that it does not link the potential risks for the politics of goals only with niche 
parties, but shows that, occasionally, parties of various origins have incentives to exit this 
type of inter-party competition. 
Narud and Valen (2001) point out the effect of the link between issue ownership and 
a party’s extreme position. They notice that in Norway, some issues have two owners. In 
these cases, the owners are regularly located on opposite sides of the political spectrum 
within which they take extreme positions. This is caused by the effect that has been docu-
mented in Lanz (2014), that is, that voters may be willing to award the highest competence 
on a certain issue even to a party with which they do not identify. Therefore, the ability of 
a party to gain issue ownership is not adversely affected by a significant difference in the spa-
tial location of the party and the voter. It is more important that the position of the party can 
be clearly distinguished from that of other parties. Another study (Lachat 2014) attempted to 
further specify this assumption. Based on data from the 2011 Swiss elections, it demonstrated 
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that, from the view of election decision-making at the individual level, competence issue 
ownership is a variable that moderates the effect of spatial distances. Put in another way, in 
reference to spatial models, granting competence issue ownership to a party means that the 
voters behaved in the election “as if they were closer to it” than they in fact were. Thus for 
a party, the cost it pays for broader spatial differentiation and location in space that is not 
“inhabited” by many voters is well compensated for by the ownership of an issue that mod-
erates spatial distances and so causes the party to be elected even by voters who are spatially 
closer to a different party (to which they grant lower competence). 
The individual strategies of voters/parties in an environment in which someone owns 
political issues have been analyzed in a number of studies. Traditional research on issue 
ownership tends to presuppose that parties try to build and maintain their reputation on the 
issues that they own and at the same time they consciously somewhat suppress other issues. 
However, this presupposition has been questioned by several studies, especially from the 
American and British contexts (Damore 2004, 2005; Sides 2006, 2007). These studies indi-
cate a growing effort on the part of candidates to communicate in their campaigns about 
issues that have been traditionally perceived as owned by their competitors. A whole range of 
reasons have been offered to explain this – primarily, it is because of the external pressures 
which sometimes simply make it impossible to avoid certain issues. Nevertheless, in some 
cases it may be due to upward-turning factors and efforts to represent a position on the given 
issues that would resonate with the voters’ views. Moreover, Coffey (2014) even directly 
states that in US elections, the amount of space that parties devote to individual issues in their 
platforms does not correlate negatively (as theories of issue ownership would suggest), but 
positively. This empirical argument corresponds with the theoretical assumption of Bonnie 
Meguid who, already in 2005, considered the strategies mainstream parties should choose 
in response to the aggressive attempts of niche parties to gain ownership of certain issues. 
Meguid thought that the rewarding strategies of mainstream parties would in this case be 
either to show a complete disinterest in the issue and try to totally ignore it or to swiftly adopt 
the issue as one of their own, including the position held by the niche party. Nevertheless, 
according to this American political scientist, it is necessary for all the parties in the party 
system to do so as part of a coordinated effort, not only the immediate competitors of the 
niche party who are closest to it spatially. This condition is much easier to postulate theoreti-
cally than to achieve practically. Especially in multi-party systems with more (four, five) par-
ties, it is actually likely that one of the parties will begin to differentiate its position from that 
of the niche party and will try to compete with it. This then leads not only to increasing the 
significance of the particular issue, but also of the importance of both (all) of the parties com-
peting on it, making it easier for niche parties to become established in the party system, and 
encouraging the other parties to differentiate their position on the issue in question. 
Dolezal et al. (2014) examined in the Austrian example how this competition unfolds in 
a country in which parties have long-term claims on certain issues. The Austrian political sys-
tem, with many established parties (such as FPÖ, BZÖ and the Greens), offers a particularly 
suitable test case. In spite of this, the average overlap in the platform issues of pairs of parties 
was around 75 %. It was also very interesting to test another premise of the theories of issue 
ownership, according to which party positions should not significantly differ on individual 
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issues. The election competition worked in this way in relation to about half the issues, some 
of which (for instance economic incentives and the environment) could be called valence 
issues here, but others (such as subsidies for urban vs. rural communities, investing in labour 
vs. investing in capital, or constitutional development) were clearly positional issues and 
should have encouraged issue polarization. Dolezal et al. linked this with the long-established 
historical agreement in Austrian consensual democracy about which political goals are to be 
preferred. However, they observed a full-fledged political conflict over not only characteristi-
cally polarizing issues such as multiculturalism and the relationship with the EU, but also on 
more valence issues such as domestic security. The positional differentiation was larger on 
issues that Kreisi et al. (2006) and Kreisi (2008) have called “the new socio-cultural issues” 
than on issues related to the economy. However, on the whole, the second premise has been 
refuted.
It is apparent that only on a single issue, the environment, did the parties differ much 
more strongly in the saliency they granted this issue than in the positions they held on it. In 
relation to many other, mainly socio-cultural issues, the pattern was exactly the opposite: the 
parties differed more in their respective positions than in the saliency the issues had for them. 
With respect to economic issues, the differences in the degree of saliency and the positions 
were about the same, but slightly bigger in the position dimension. The data revealed a fairly 
surprising pattern – as for the issues on which a party’s position strongly differed from the 
position of other parties, apart from some exceptional cases, the party usually did not devote 
any more attention to this issue than its competitors. It is possible that in relation to specifi-
cally these issues, the positional differentiation of a particular party offers incentives to the 
other parties to prevent this differentiated party from gaining not just ownership of the issue, 
but also potentially a position with which voters will gradually come to identify after granting 
ownership of the issue to the only party talking about it. This demonstrates the complicated 
relationship between issue ownership, “competing through issues”, and the positional deci-
sions of the various actors. 
Therefore, in the context of the examination of “non-competition” in this text, let us sug-
gest the following causal mechanism: when trying to gain issue ownership (the strongest pos-
sible association with and/or granted competence on a certain issue), the rewarding tactic for 
political parties is significant positional differentiation on this issue (taking a different spatial 
position) in respect to other parties. However, after a party has claimed ownership of some 
issue, this differentiation contributes to suppressing the activation of the principles of domi-
nance because at least some of the other parties continue to discuss the issue, and so a compe-
tition in which the main mechanism would be issue ownership in its pure form does not take 
place. Instead, the resulting competition takes the form of differences in the degree to which 
parties assign significantly lower saliency to individual issues are, and at the same time, there 
is a much stronger positional differentiation than the theory of issue ownership assumes. This 
theory can thus be regarded as more than just an ideal type that suggests a possible tendency 
of party competition, but a tendency against which there exist, in the mechanism of competi-
tion, certain counter forces that lead the struggle back to a mode that remains a full-fledged 
“competition”. 
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Conclusion 
This article has attempted to provide at least a brief overview of the structure of opportunities 
and limitations related to the potential transition from competition strategies characterized by 
party conflict on political issues to other strategies. It has shown that, in the case of valence, 
it is the nature of the strategies themselves to offer actors (regardless of whether the valence 
is high or low) strong incentives to simultaneously take advantage of positional conflict. In 
the case of issue ownership, positional differentiation is a factor that contributes to parties’ 
efforts to create an imbalance in how they are associated with particular issues and in their 
ability to gain ownership of these issues. However, when this imbalance is actually achieved, 
it becomes a factor that prevents the parties that do not own the given issue from completely 
dropping out of the competition and the conflict connected to it. 
Table 1: The main types of issue competition 
Source: Chytilek (2014: 174)
Table 1 summarizes the conclusion of the preceding discussion. It shows that depending on 
which strategy parties or candidates initially prefer in issue competition, the other strate-
gies also gradually come into play. The result of their interplay is most often a competition 
between political parties in which the factors related to the parties’ conflicts caused by dif-
fering political positions as well as the factors related to non-issue aspects interact with “the 
character of the parties and/or candidates”. However, it is important to note that in any of 
these interactions incentives are not strong enough for the complete dominance of the politics 
of outcomes and thus of “non-competition”. 
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